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The regulation of biomedicine and its practices, including Medically Assisted 
Reproduction (MAR) has been an important challenge for law in general, and family 
law in particular.(Ι) After national legislators questioned both symbolically and 
practically whether or not they should or could produce the regulatory framework for 
the use of reproductive technology, they included themselves in an innovative model 
of control, namely that of co-regulation. (Ι.1). MAR is regulated by a miscellany of 
competent bodies, regulations and procedures related to law, bioethics, technology 
sciences and economics, which operates in a cyclical way. So how can the operation 
of this model be appraised thirty years after its introduction? What was its influence in 
the way family law is related to social reality (Ι.2)?. To what extent has it been 
adopted and integrated in Greece (Ι.3)?  
 At the same time, especially after the year 2000 family law has been faced 
with the challenge of integrating in its institutions partnership and  kinship of people 
of the same gender (ΙΙ). The pressure is due to a wider change, the dissolution of 
gender difference and the legal and political assertions of the gay movement (ΙΙ.1). 
Already most legislators of European countries have allowed homosexuals access to 
its institutions. The response on the part of legislators enhances the interactive nature 
of the legislator's relation to social reality (ΙΙ.2). The question that arises is whether in 
the effort to fully include the same gender family the legislator has been moving 
towards the direction of expanding the scope of MAR, so that it transcend the 
biological inability to procreate due to the fact that the couple consists of people of the 
same gender (ΙΙ.3). The relation of MAR with same-gender families is particularly 
interesting for the Greek family law, given the divided social attitudes towards 
couples of the same gender and the contradictions that emanate from the combination 
of legislative changes after the year 2000 (ΙΙ.4). 
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 Ι. Challenges and innovation in the regulation of biomedical practice of MAR: a 
post hoc appraisal 
 
Ι.1.The challenge of regulating MAR as a biomedical practice 
The term MAR denotes a combination of methods/practices that have been 
developed to treat infertility. It is a biomedical technique since it combines the 
applications of medicine with those of biology, using the organs and products of one 
person's body as a means of treatment (direct or expected) of serious physical 
difficulties of other people. This use alludes to complex (and often conflicting) socio-
economic choices. Since biomedicine blends scientific theories with therapeutic 
methods and socio-economic choices, it is defined as a combination of technological 
practices based on the use of the human body and its products. The human body, 
carrier of life (inextricably connected with human personality) becomes a source of 
indispensable, productive material which can be controlled, exchanged and capitalized 
on, in order to achieve goals with direct or indirect financial results. That is why the 
regulation of biomedicine requires enacted procedures of collective evaluation and 
calculation of therapeutic expectations against the risks e.g of commercialisation or/ 
and instrumentalisation of the human body, for private and public purposes1.  
The “nature” of the above calculation of vested interests is obviously political, 
in the sense of the gist of decisions that need to be made, but also because of their 
procedure. On one hand reproductive technology concerns societies in their entirety, 
because it presupposes a crucial political choice of how the human body should be 
utilised. It also concerns numerous social groups with complimentary and conflicting 
interests e.g public and private agencies which provide healthcare services or patients 
who are in need of human body products and healthy people who are the bearers of 
these products. On the other hand, even today and despite their serious flaws, decision 
making institutions which are organised on the basis of democratic principles 
historically remain the best expression of balance of social powers. Under this light 
the law, also perceived as a system of communication which tends to regulate civil 
partnership both symbolically and practically, constitutes the appropriate system to 
regulate the use of reproductive technology and organise biomedical practices. The 
law provides both the language of a valid discourse that will ascribe at least a 
                                                          
1 Rethymniotaki H., Regulation or self-regulation? The example of medically assisted reproduction, 
Ant. N. Sakkoulas publications, Athens- Komotini, 2003, p. 10 et seq. 
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minimum of commonly accepted moral values that the practical organization of social 
action demands2. 
Especially MAR requires first and foremost the demarcation of the circle of 
people that may have access to its use. Secondly it raises the issue of the legal nature 
of human reproductive material use (i.e whether it is an element of a person or a thing 
3) as well as its distribution (through sale or donation)4. The relevant discussion 
resonates the wider theoretical debate about the human body and its legal association 
with the person5. The same discussion also applies to fertilised ova, concerning who 
has the power to distribute them and if the supernumerary ones should be donated, 
used for research or discarded. Thirdly, especially the practice of surrogacy highlights 
the gender-centered nature of the commercialization of the human body at the end of 
the 20th century, meaning the fact that the human body is utilised to a different extent 
and on different conditions according to whether it is male or female6. Fourth, there is 
the question of kinship regarding the children born through the use of MAR 
techniques7. The legislator stipulates the relation of motherhood and fatherhood and is 
called upon to exclude or not the biological progenitors and the woman that carried a 
child on behalf of another woman. This is done by the enactment of their anonymity 
or a presumption in favour of the socio-emotional mother8, so that the children born 
can have only one father and one mother. In the end the question that arises is if the de 
facto involvement of more people in the birth of the above children will evolve or not 
into a de jure form of multiple parenthood. 
                                                          
2 Vidalis, T., Life without a face. The Constitution and the use of human reproductive material, Ant. N. 
Sakkoulas Publications, Athens 1999, p. 30 and citation to: J. Ηabermas, Ethics of  discourse. Notes on 
a foundation programme, Theory and Society, 4/1991, p. 15 et seq. 
3 Κounougeri- Manoledaki Ε., Sperm, egg and fertilized egg outside the human body– Their legal 
nature and treatment under Civil Law, Arm. 1999, p. 468 et seqq. and Papachristou Th. K., ‘Faces’ and 
‘things’ in modern law (on the occasion of the legal nature of reproductive material), in: Hon. Vol 
dedicated to Ioannis Manoledakis ΙΙΙ, Athens – Thessaloniki, Sakkoulas publications, 2005, p. 915-926. 
4
 Hottois G., Solidarité et disposition du corps humain: au delà de la symbolique du don et de 
l’opérativité du marché, σε: M.-H.Parizeau (ed.), Les fondements de la bioéthique, De Boeck, 
Bruxelles, 1992, p. 103 et seq. 
5 Edelman B./Labrusse-Riou C./Hermitte M.-A., L’homme, la nature, le droit. Le droit du vivant, 
Bourgois, Paris, 1988. 
6 Αthanassiou Ath., Gender and sexuality in the discourse and practices of bioscience: Epistemiologies 
and technologies of the gender body, in: R..Astrinaki/ P. Hantzroula/ At. Athanassiou, Studies on 
gender in anthropology and history, Athens, Alexandria publ., 2011, pp.227-315, esp 269et seq. 
7 Rethymniotaki  (2003) op. cit. p. 146 et seq. 
8 Rethymniotaki H., A comparative gender reading of the changes in family law after the regulation of 
biomedical technology, in: Maropoulou, Μ. (ed.), The gender, the body and the gender difference: the 
intersection of law and social problematics, Athens, UOA & Course for the Study of gender and 
Equality ed, 2008, p. 49-65. 
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However, MAR appeared and developed in the past thirty five years, a period 
during which the balance among the three regulating poles, the state, the market and 
civil society, was radically reconfigured9. Initially the law was “carried away” by the 
crisis and the transformation of the state, the top political institution of modernity. 
Within the framework of public discourse it was questioned whether or not state law 
should and could, in fact, effectively regulate and organise MAR practices. The same 
applied to all domains where the market technological application of scientific 
knowledge raised social and legal issues. Finally the market and the civil society 
claimed, and to a great extent managed, to participate in the regulation of MAR.What 
was overturned at first was the post-war model of social control over medical practice 
and scientific research, which was based on the allocation between medical 
profession/ state on one hand, and medical ethics/ medical law on the other, with a 
judge as a locum tenens of their regulatory scope of jurisdiction. Doctors themselves 
publicly declined the management of reproductive technology because it demands a 
risk assessment and a reconciliation of conflicting interests. Finally a complicated 
system for the regulation of MAR was established, where law, scientific ethics and 
rules of morality intersect and develop complementary and competitive relations. 
 
Ι.2.The innovation of co-regulation and the role of law: an appraisal 
The innovation of co-regulation regards the fact that MAR, as it so happens 
with all biomedical practices, is regulated by a network of rules/competent bodies and 
procedures which merges bioethics, law, scientific, technological and financial 
domains of social action. Nowadays bioethics and best practices in science and law 
have developed complementary or/end competitive relations to such an extent as to 
form an intricate system of social control over biomedicine, through which its 
regulation is finally achieved.10. Regulatory principles are transferred from the field of 
ethics to the field of law and vice versa. The institutional bodies of each of the above 
combine their function to jointly achieve control over biomedicine. In the end, since 
the dividing lines between law, ethics, morality, scientific rules and audit bodies have 
become dotted and their limits fluid, organization and social control of biomedicine 
                                                          
9 Jessop B., The Future of Capitalist State, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2002, p. 228et seq. 
10 Rethimiotaki H., De la déontologie médicale à la bioéthique. Etude de sociologie juridique, PhD 
Thesis, Paris II, Atelier National de Reproduction des Thèses - Presses Universitaires de Septentrion, 
Lille, 2002, p. 380 et seq. 
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operate as a network where every hub is necessary for the organisation and the control 
of MAR.  
So, after thirty years, how do we evaluate the role of state law within the 
framework of MAR co-regulation? Did it lose or win something after this new 
institutional arrangement? Admittedly, national legislators of European countries 
initially conceded some of their regulatory power but in the end they  regulated MAR 
and in fact they did so while maintaining their national legal cultures, as they have 
been shaped through the political history of each country. European legislative 
regulations present considerable differences, which express profound and general 
attitudes towards the evaluation of legal goods that conflict so that the overall 
regulation can be achieved. Notable cases in point are the sale of reproductive 
material in England, the disclosure of donor identity in Sweden, the very limited 
research use of fertilised eggs in Germany and the prohibition of surrogacy in France. 
However, in the light of a political sociology of law the common point is that state 
law, as a regulatory system, “healed” through reconceptualization its shaken 
legalization and enhanced its practical function. However, the extent to which this 
happened depends on the particular circumstances that prevailed in every individual 
country during that period of time. 
So in France for example, the innovative hub of this network was definitely 
bioethics because it connected the professional groups involved, the scientific 
community of different specialties, the public and private healthcare services 
providers, the legislator, the judge and the citizens. Bioethics was progressively 
established in the mid 80's in three different forms that intersect before public opinion: 
as a philosophical reflection, as public discourse among 'experts' and as a system of 
organization and control of biomedicine11. It was legalized in a dual way; on one hand 
as collective ethics, a prospective that examines social action in a general light, 
substituting or/and complementing politics12 and on the other hand as an alternative 
model of control interposed between regulation and self-regulation by Bioethics 
Committees that  operate on different levels. Finally bioethics reinforced the 
                                                          
11 Isambert F.-A., Aux sources de la bioéthique, Le Débat, 1983, vol.25, p. 83 -99 and Terrenoire J.P., 
Approche théorique du champs éthique, L’année sociologique 1979-1980, vol. 30, p.57-75. 
12 Terrenoire J.-P., Sociologie de l’éthique: contribution à la réflexion théorique, Sociétés 
contemporaines 7/1991, p. 7 et seq. and ι Crousse B./Rouban L., Progrès scientifique et Débat éthique: 
plaidoyer pour l'analyse politique, Cerf, Paris, 1989. 
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legislator, expanding the realm of public discourse in order to achieve the social 
consensus necessary for the legislative regulation. At the same time, since it is 
produced by bodies of an inter-professional nature it legalized the self-regulatory 
dynamics of the competent bodies involved in the process through an interdisciplinary 
approach and the publicization of issues of interest. The above bodies may not have 
regulatory power, however they enjoy a broader symbolic prestige. They may give 
formal opinions only on specific issues that arise but they have progressively 
formulated a set of principles which served as a point of reference for all MAR 
stakeholders. Even if they do not have regulatory jurisdictions and mechanisms of 
supervision many a time they have indeed inspired legislators, judges and institutional 
bodies13. In this way bioethics transcended the regulatory scope of conventional ethics 
since it transcended the realm of individual relations and it expanded to the relations 
of the institutional bodies involved in the process. The regulatory principles shaped 
are no longer destined for internal consumption by certain social groups but they can 
potentially regulate the conduct of all stakeholders involved in that specific social 
activity14.  
Furthermore, the evaluation clause of the statutes encompassed in the so called 
“bioethics laws” has proved to be an important innovation15 (signifying through their 
very name the interaction between law and bioethics), especially after the passing of 
time. The evaluation of the statutes for MAR has already been made twice by the 
National Bioethics Committee (which in the meantime became an Independent 
administrative Authority), the special Committee of the Council of State for the 
evaluation of the scientific and technological choices made by Parliament and the 
parliamentary committee spoecifically set up for this purpose. The procedure is 
completed with the hearings of experts before the Senate, at the stage of statute 
preliminary processing. This is a cyclical procedure of joint evaluation of regulatory 
systems whose outcomes are “inscribed” within each one of them. This kind of 
                                                          
13 Rethimiotaki (2002) eadem 
14 Decoopman Ν., Droit et déontologie. Contribution à l'étude des modes de régulation, in: 
C.U.R.A.P.P., Les usages sociaux du droit, P.U.F., Paris, 1989, p. 87 et seq.  
15 Law. 654/1994 on the donation and use of elements and products of the human body, M.A.R and 
prenatal diagnosis was re-evaluated and updated with the 800/2004 law on bioethics. It was updated 
anew with the law. 814/2011, which provides for its updating 7 years after its enactment. 
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interactive evaluation constitutes one of the distinctive characteristics of modern law, 
based on the theoretical paradigm of networks16. 
 
Ι.3. The Greek model of Medically Assisted Reproduction regulation 
In Greece, on the contrary, it seems that the need to invent new forms of 
organization and supervision in view of the regulation of biomedical practices in the 
light of the reconfiguration of relations between the market, technological sciences, 
the state and civil society has not been fully understood. Since the beginning of the 
year 2000 bioethics may indeed have been developing in the domains of philosophical 
and interdisciplinary reflections, however public discourse has remained limited. 
Indeed the National Bioethics Committee (NBC) was established (law 2667/1998) 
and was officially active  since the year 2000. Its composition is interdisciplinary and 
its jurisdiction is consultative. It addresses its proposals and opinions to the competent 
bulic bodies- either when it is asked to do so, or by its own initiative.As it comes out 
of the annual reports the NBC for the most part chose issues by its own initiative, 
having reason to believe that the issues in question would sooner or later be relevant 
for Greece, too. Especially in the light of the legislative regulation of MAR the 
Committee was called upon to express its opinion. It has been publicizing its opinions 
and reports electronically on its website since 2005 and it communicates them to the 
Parliamentary Standing Committee for the Evaluation of Technology, so that MPs can 
be informed about bioethical issues. Since 2004 it has been calling experts to make 
specialised presentations in order to be informed on how issues are formulated and 
record conditions prevalent in Greek reality17. However, the question lies in the extent 
to which the NBC and other Bioethics Committees (where operative) have trully 
elaborated on the organization of practices, up to the point of becoming an important 
constituent of the Greek  regulatory model of bioethics, as it functions in the midst of 
the state and the market. For this reason the law officially remains the exclusively and 
absolutely dominant regulatory framework, however in practice it either abstains or 
                                                          
16 Ost.Fr./ Kerchove M.de, De la pyramide au réseau? Pour une théorie dialectique du droit, 
Publications des Facultés universitaires nSaint-Loouis, Bruxelles, 2002, esp p. 316 andι Rethymniotaki 
H., The regulation of biomedicine and the post-modern paradigm of the relation between law and 
ethics, in: St. Tsinorema/ Κ. Louis (ed), Bioethical Issues. Life, Society and Nature faced with the 
challenges of biosciences, Univ. of Crete eds, Herakleion 2013, p. 171-192. 
17 Ε.Ε.Β., Annual report  2003-2004 and 2008-2009 in: www.bioethics.gr 
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regresses. Even after the enactment of rules and designation of competent bodies the 
regulation has been functioning suboptimally.  
Especially MAR, constitutes perhaps the most representative case of 
biomedical regulation model, which has finally been shaped in Greece18. At first 
MAR was established in the private sector, without even rudimentary administrative 
supervision, in conditions of partial operation of supervisory mechanisms of the 
medical profession. To a great extent it was shaped in an arbitrary manner by private 
centres, which even today operate without always keeping due records and without 
official certification to confirm that they do abide by medical protocols; centres which 
endeavoured to transfer the therapeutic risk responsibility to couples faced with 
problems of infertility19. The adverse issues which need to be managed and are related 
to the use of MAR techniques have not really been highlighted by the mass media 
during public discourse because the technique was related to the fulfillment of the 
social duty of women to become mothers, especially in the light of the serious 
problem of low birth rate in Greece20. Furthermore the case law (numbering a few but 
indicative rulings) encouraged the establishment of kinship relations of the children 
born through MAR, acknowledging from the very beginning the priority of the socio-
emotional bond over the biological one. However, in this way the life-changing 
potential of MAR was minimally emphasized. Apart from the domain of legal theory, 
discussions failed to focus on several aspects: the fact that reproductive technology 
enables the birth of children without the requirement of sexual contact between a 
couple of people of a different gender, the establishment of kinship relations which do 
not coincide with the biological truth and the commercialization of the female body. 
The legislator regulated the medical practice with law 3089/2002 and law 
3305/2005 and reserved the use of MAR exclusively for therapeutic treatment 
purposes, first and foremost, but also acknowledged the borderline expressions of the 
freedom to procreate, under strict circumstances. Secondly, the legislator 
acknowledged the power of a person to dispose their own reproductive cells and 
                                                          
18 Rethymniotaki H. (a), Bioethics as a model of regulation and control of biomedicine in Greece; 
appraisal and future challenges, in: Κanellopoulou- Botis Μ./ Panagopoulou-Κoutnatzi F. (ed.),Medical 
Liability and Bioethics, Modern Approaches and future perspectives, Abstracts of Interdisciplinary 
Congress, 1-2 March 2013 Athens, Broken Hill Partners Ltd, 2014, p. 295-317.  
19 Rethymniotaki (2003) op.cit. p. 76 et seq. 
20 Chalkia Al., New reproductive technologies, traditional subjects p.102 et seq., in: eadem, gender 
brutalities: power, speech, subjectivities, Athens, Alexandria Publ., 2011 and Rethymniotaki (2003) op. 
cit. p. 100 et seq. 
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defined the legal requirements for such disposition. Thirdly, the motherhood and 
fatherhood of all people resorting to the use of reproductive technology explicitly 
expressing their volition to become parents was legislated without reserve. In what 
concerns the organization of the practice the legislator proceeded to the establishment 
of the National MAR Authority, aiming at organising, licensing, supervising and 
solving particular problems related to the technique. However, the Authority was then 
left inactive and as a result it discontinued its operation in June 2010 21 only to bounce 
back recently. This means that the Authority was not sufficiently supported by 
administration so as to conclude even its rudimentary work, which was to audit and 
grant license of operation to MAR centres and also organise the national registry of 
epidemiological data and outcomes related to MAR in Greece. For all that matters, the 
reluctance of the Greek state to organise the supervision of the practice has de facto 
changed the balance in the calculations made by the legislator in the course or 
regulating MAR in what concerns the risk of commercial exploitation of the female 
body, for example. This led to the strengthening of the trend of illegal trafficking of 
women, aiming at using them as surrogates through criminal organisations22 and the 
so-called reproductive tourism23. 
Finally the way of enforcement of the current legal framework by judges 
significantly influences the above balances. For example, a study of the rulings of 
voluntary jurisdiction concerning surrogacy agreements indicated that more than half 
of the surrogates are women from countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans and in 
fact these women are, to a great extent, related to domestic help and have a dependent 
, working relationship with the commissioning parents24. However, judges have 
proven quite frugal in terms of fully using the current interrogation system in order to 
                                                          
21Skorini- Paparigopoulou, National Authority for Medically Assisted Reproduction: Experience and 
prospects, Society for the study of medical law and bioethics  and Aristotle University of Thessaloniki 
group  “Modern Medical practice- Bioethics and Law”, conference dedicated to  E. Kounougeri- 
Manoledaki , MAR: 10 years after the enactment of law 3089/2002, Thessaloniki, 26-27April 2012. 
22 Kanagos Κ., Surrogacy. Greek legal system and criminal implications, Sakkoulas Publications, 
Athens- Thessaloniki, 2011. 
23 Picramenou, N. Reproductive Tourism in Europe. Legal and Ethical. The Cases of Sweden and 
Greece. Uppsala University, European Master’s Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation 2013-
2014, in: http://www.constitutionalism.gr/site/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/2014_Pikramenou-
Nicole_Reproductive-tourism. pdfconstitutionalism.gr 
24 Rabdas, P., Surrogacy: the expectations of the legislator in the statistical data tests, in: Th..Κ. 
Papachristos/ Ε. Kounougeri- Manoledaki/ Α. Kotzabasi/ Ν. koumountzis/G. Lekkas/ D. Papadopoulou- 
Kalamari/ P. Rabdas/ G. Sergidis/ Th. Trokanas/ Κ. Foundedaki, Family law in the 21st century; from 
conjectural to structural change, Sakkoulas Publications, Athens- Thessaloniki, 2011, p. 67-89. 
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thoroughly examine whether the altruism displayed by the future surrogate is real or 
not. On the contrary, when the judge was called upon to decide whether single men, 
too, had the right to use a surrogate, it seemed at first that they grasped the full 
dynamics of individual access (and not the access of couples) that the Greek legislator 
acknowledged for single women , for reasons of anatomy. Even if in the end the 
rulings were repealed the dynamics of the Greek regulation of MAR was highligted 
more clearly. 
 
ΙΙ. The challenge of families with no gender difference: the interaction of law 
with social practice and the use of reproductive technology 
 
ΙΙ.1.The cultural fluidity of gender difference in sexual and partnership relations 
under the pressure of legal-political assertions of the homosexual movement  
 
At the beginning of the 21st century it is no longer considered a foregone 
conclusion that people are divided, based on their anatomy, in men and women who 
instinctively form sexual relations through which they reproduce. This is a major 
cultural change fostered on a social level after the legal- political assertions made by 
the homosexual movement, of both its conservative and radical strand. This is a 
change inscribed in the broader social-economic environment of societies of late 
modernity. The human body on one hand becomes a symbol, incorporated in 
production procedures and is commercialized. On the other hand, it becomes the 
object of a fundamental battle fought so that the subjects, the bearers of the human 
body, can regain control over it25. The body is perceived as a basic constituent to a 
person's self and its bearers constantly try to “transform” it26. The human body and the 
relation of the subjects with it are in the forefront of assertion of rights also by the gay 
movement.The different (not mainstream) sexual orientation is invested as an element 
of either a minority identity or a different inter-subjectiveness (a way of relating 
through one's body) which need to be respected as such. 
On an academic level the theoretical paradigms that prevail in social theory on 
gender and sexuality, on one hand the feminist-materialist and on the other hand the 
                                                          
25 Castels M., The information age, II. The power of identity, Oxford, Blackwell, 2003, p. 424. 
26 Makrynioti D., Introduction to: D. Makrynioti, The limits of the body, Interdisciplinary approaches, 
Athens, Nissos publishing, 2004, p. 11-73, esp. p. 27. 
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constructivist, especially the version of representational performance, converge in the 
ascertainment that the way in which gender/sexual identities are produced, reproduced 
and transformed has changed, even though this change is explained and delineated 
under a different light27. The crux to the issue under examination is whether or not and 
to what extent the importance of gender difference as a constituent to sexual, 
partnership and kinship relations has been ironed out, socially speaking. The two 
examples, even if they perceive the role of gender differently28 converge on the fact 
that on one hand gender continues to function as a category of social prioritization 
that material structures or/and discursive practices mould in order to legalize relations 
of power. Secondly they also converge in that the dominant model of heterosexual 
sexuality constitutes a vital pillar of the hegemonic structure. Third, they agree on the 
fact that a paradigm shift presupposes radical change in either productive relations or 
symbolically constructed gender and sexual classifications29. However both conclude 
that under certain circumstances they can be questioned to a considerable extent, for 
different reasons. According to the materialistic example since the political economy 
of categorisations has changed, due to general circumstances formed as subjects of 
collective action claimed (and to an important extent achieved) to re- draw the lines of 
the “magic circle” of sexual stratification30 despite the strong reactions of other 
groups to that. According to the concepts of performance, gender difference was 
dissolved through repeated individual “variations” which multiplied to such an extent 
that they destabilised considerably the prevalent categories and they re-conceptualized 
them. 
                                                          
27 Giannakopoulos Κ., Sexuality stories, in: Giannakopoulos, Κ. (ed.), Sexuality . Theories and Policies 
of Anthropology, Athens, Alexandria Publications, 2006, p. 17-102. 
28 According to the feminist, materialist theory, gender constitutes a socio-historical material 
relationship of inequality, which is related to the way of production of a society. The political economy 
of gender is determined (i.e it is reproduced but also transformed) by the historical development of 
each society. According to the constructivist theory, biological and social gender constitute cultural 
constructs of inequality. Genderization is a constant process of representational performance through 
which subjects mould themselves, re-negotiating the power-related reasons that lead to their 
production. Indicatively Giannakopoulos (2006) , idem. and Astrinaki Α., Anthropological Approaches 
to gender: A review, in: Kantsa Β./ Moutafi Β./ Papataxiarchis  Efth. (ed.), Studies on gender in 
anthropology and history, Athens, Alexandria Publications, 2011, p. 17-128. 
29 The transpositions of the signifier does not suffice in order to radically modify the signified, Butler 
J., Merely cultural?, New Left Review, 1/227, 1998.  
30 Rubin G., Thoughts on sexuality: footnotes for a radical theory of policies of sexuality, in: 
Giannakopoulos Κ. (ed.), Sexuality. Theories & Policies of Anthropology, Athens, Alexandria 
publications, 2006,pp. 401-481, esp pp. 424-425. 
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Therefore, one may not validly claim either that the material relations of 
exploitation have been reversed or that the dominant narratives on gender identities 
and sexual identifications have been de-constructed. After all, such a transcendence of 
structural limits would have been noticed readily with the naked eye! However, 
gender and sexual bipolarity has been shaken to a considerable extent because of the 
combined influence of changes made on the level of structures and agents of action. 
On one hand the body and its products have become processable products through 
innovative technologies and have acquired particularly lucrative uses in rapidly 
developing markets31. In a framework of aestetic re-conceptualization they become 
points of reference and through allegories they are elevated to the state of symbols32. 
Through their consumption the subjects publicly manifest versions of themselves, 
asserting identities. The crucial question is whether this is a theatrical game in which 
subjects are involved because of a wider aesthetization of their daily lives33 .Or 
whether this is a deeper psychological process of reconstruction through which the 
subject positions himself/herself against their own selves and challenges others to do 
the same34. The generalised commercialisation involving body, gender and sexuality35 
(both straight and queer) and even kinship itself, advocate the first question. Points in 
favour of the second question regard the fact that assertions for the expression of any 
sexual desire are inescapably intertwined with categories of self-perception on one 
hand and a search of ways to connect with others physically on the other. Therefore it 
all boils down to a deeper, psychological process. 
On the other hand the role of the movement of homosexual people, who 
became an object of politics, has been crucial. Especially socially privileged, white 
men36 asserted their rights using as a vehicle the right to equal treatment and tolerance 
of their different sexual orientation. They claimed the right to non-discrimination in 
the name of belonging to a different minority category and to an extent they 
succeeded- making the (unavoidable in every negotiation) necessary concessions. The 
                                                          
31 Indicatively services of body decoration (piercing/tatoo) and body building, aesthetic surgical and 
dermatological medical procedures and reproductive technology.  
32 Lash S./ Urry J., Economies of Signs & Space, London, Sage Publications, 1994, p. 59. 
33 Featherstone M. The body in consumer society, Theory, Culture and Society, 1982/2, 1, p. 18-33. 
34 Moore H., A Passion for Difference: Essays in Anthropology and Gender, Cambridge, Cambridge 
Polity Press, 1994 p. 170. 
35 Hennesy R., Profit and Pleasure: Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism, Routledge, London/New York, 
2000 
36 Given the fact that gender and sexual relations are defined by the wider social framework where they 
develop and they interact with social class and race. 
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assertion was legalized through the reference to an “imaginary” community but, as it 
also happened with the feminist movement, this assertion was questioned from inside 
the movement. Part of the movement re-appropriated the derogatory term 'queer', 
denoting what is sexually weird, eccentric, peculiar, which marginalises “anything 
that goes against the normal, the legal, the mainstream”37. The trend of the “queer” 
movement believes that obsession with identity substantiates homosexuality and 
constitutes a strategy which may create a mirror reflection of an equally oppressive 
status of “homonormality”38 which will culminate in the legal-political assertion of 
the paramount institution of “heteronormality”, i.e marriage. It seems as if the 
conquest of the right to equal treatment had as a price the disarmament of homosexual 
erotic desire39. So has the pressure been released or is this a more profound disruption 
of the dominating arrangements for sexuality? On one hand, the internal “division” 
induced in the gay community, especially in view of the management of AIDS, 
advocates the first answer. The same applies to the feminist movement for female 
sexuality, on the occasion of versions of lesbian sexuality but also pornography. The 
very strong opposition expressed to the legislation of homosexual partnership and 
kinship relations that gay people make on the basis of homosexual erotic desire is a 
point in favour of the second answer. However, for all intents and purposes, the nature 
of assertions made by the homosexual movement is political and it was regarded as 
such by both judges and legislators. 
 
ΙΙ.2. The response of the family law legislator in the following enactment of law: 
the interactive relation of law and social reality 
Asserting rights in terms of identity has been a political strategy which served 
(and perhaps no longer serves)40  the purpose of construction of a relatively unified 
subject of political action, because through it the social differences and different 
practices among homosexual people were erased. In fact homosexuality is a fluid 
                                                          
37 Fuss D., Lesbian and gay theories: the problem of identity policy, in: Athanassiou Ath. (ed)., 
Feminist theory and cultural critique, Athens, Nissos publishing, 2006, p. 543-569.  
38 Κanakis Κ., The desire for identity and the identity for desire, in: Apostolelli Α./ Chalkia Α., Body, 
Gender, Sexuality. LGBT policies in Greece, Athens, Plithron bublications, 2012, pp.137- 171, esp p. 
149. 
39 Bersani, L., Hommos, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1995. 
40 Butler J., Bodies that matter. On the discursive limits of 'sex', Athens, Ekkremes publ., 2008, p. 238. 
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category of self-perception41. However, since sexuality has a relationship dimension 
and addresses others, it also expresses the quest of connecting with these other people 
through the body42.  
In the perspective of a political Sociology of law, however, it is of interest that 
in the name of this identity or community, different social groups adopting a pattern of 
movement action questioned cultural mentalities, invented new forms of intimacy 
relations and finally claimed their acknowledgement by the law, giving new meaning 
to some of its categories, whose significance was indeed crucial. This action expresses 
the trend of inclusive citizen participation in the production and application of law in 
democratic societies43. The recruitment of the law from below in order to 
acknowledge homosexual sexuality, partnership and family spans to the dual 
dimension of the law, the power-exerting and the symbolic one44. On one hand 
organised groups of homosexuals use the typical political channels of communication 
in order to exert pressure on the state to legally acknowledge their relations ascribing 
to them rights in all domains of law, family, social insurance, taxation, employment 
etc. Opposing social groups attempted to interrupt their action using the very same 
channels. In this respect the assertions of homosexuals constitute examples of anti-
hegemonic use of law, which precedes legislative change45. They illustrate the 
awareness that legislative change constitutes a necessary but not absolute requirement 
to overturn hegemonic structures.  
On the other hand one can observe all the features of law activation by social 
movements46, an active process of production of regulatory meaning whereby the 
cultural power of the law is proven. First we had the publicization and then the 
magnification of the social injustice against the people involved47. At this stage the 
legality of regulations and practices was put into question, since they violated 
                                                          
41 Αthanassiou Ath., Introduction to: Ath. ,Athanassiou (ed.), feminist theory and cultural 
critique,Athens, Nissos publ., 2006, p. 13-138, esp. p. 95.  
42 Papanikolaou D., “Made like me. Cavafy the homosexual and the poetics of sexuality, Athens, 
Patakis publications, 2014, p. 347.  
43 Commaille J./ Dumoulin L., De la critique du capitalisme à la réalisation de la démocratie par le droit 
? Présentation, Droit et société, 2010/ 3 n° 76, p. 513-521. 
44 Hull K., Same Sex Marriage: The Cultural Politics of Love and Law, Cambridge University Press, 
2006, p. 15et seq. 
45 Ηunt A., Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies, Journal of Law and Society, 
Autumn 1990 17/ 3, p. 309-328. 
46 Agrikoliansky Ε., Les usages protestataires du droit, in: E. Agrikoliansky /J. Sommier/ O. Fillieule 
(dir.), Penser les mouvements sociaux, La Découverte, Paris, 2010, pp. 225-243 and Hunt ibidem. 
47 McCann Μ., Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives, Annual Review of Law and 
Social Science, 2006, vol.2, p. 17-38. 
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individual rights. Secondly, in the code of the legal system, they were translated into 
issues that can be supported through legal principles and means48. In the field of 
sociology of law the notion of “legal conscience” describes this sense of legality 
which emerges through what people say and do in reference to the law. Thirdly, the 
problem was generalised since it was incorporated in the sphere of universal 
problems, meaning the consolidation of democracy through which stakeholder groups 
also aspire to the creation of alliances. As a result the “sexual capacity of citizens” 
emerged, the need for the different, non-mainstream sexual orientation to be 
respected, so that homosexuals be recognised as an integral part of a democratic 
community49. Fourthly, the issue was expanded since it projected the challenge that it 
represents for the entire legal system and culture, which is the definition and nature of 
family and the historically changing balance between individual autonomy and 
institutional protection. The aspiration now is to turn tolerance into acceptance and 
finally inclusion of all forms of sexuality, partnership and family in the institutions of 
the law50. 
The law has progressively responded to the petitions of the homosexual 
movement on both a judiciary and a legislative level. The ECJ acknowledged at first 
the right to non-discrimination due to sexual orientation on a legal basis, the freedom 
to self-determination. Then it acknowledged the relationship dimension to privacy, the 
person's right to enter into relationships of intimacy and to establish partnership and 
family ties51. Finally it defined family life as a relationship of intimacy, which 
manifests itself as a continuous coexistence (not necessarily co-habitation) of people 
expressing the feeling of mutual devotion, illustrating their willingness to commit 
                                                          
48 Gaiti B./ Israel L., Sur l’ engagement du droit dans la construction des causes, Politix, 2003, Vol.16, 
No 62, p.17-30 and Hull op.cit. p. 17 and p. 23-24. 
49 Αthanassiou Ath.., Remnants of the “capacity of citizen”: gender, sexuality, nationality and other 
exceptions that matter , in: G. Kouzelis / D. Christopoulos (ed.), the Capacity of Citizen. Political 
discourse, history and rules in comparative prospectives, Athens, Patakis Publications, 2012,  p. 242-
259.  
50 Weeks J., Live and Let Love? Reflections on the unfinished sexual revolution of our times, in: 
Edwards, R./Clover, J. (eds), Risk and Citizenship, London N.Y., 2001, p.49-63. 
51 Papadopoulou L.., Same-gender marriage? An endeavour for a legal  and political evaluation , in,: 
Kanellopoulou- Botis-, Μ./ Koutnatzi-Panagopoulou, F., Bioethical Concerns, Athens, Papazisis 
publications, 2014, p. 653-760 and Μallios Β. (a), Cohabitation and marriage of same-gender couples: 
three new small steps. Commentary on the Schalk and Kopf versus Austria ruling of the ECJ , 
24.06.2010 http://www.constitutionalism.gr/site/mallios-schalk-kopf/ 
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irrespective of biological gender and sexual orientation52. As a notable case in point, 
in 2013 the US Supreme Federal Court struck down the DOMA Act (In defense of 
Marriage Act) of 1996, which practically cancelled on a federal level the legislative 
acknowledgement of marriage between people of the same gender, wherever it had 
been enacted, overriding the allocation of jurisdictions between the States and the 
Federal government.  
In addition, since the 90's European legislations have been progressively 
allowing homosexual couples to have access to institutions of family law53. The same 
gender partnership relations can fall within the framework of some form of 
partnership agreement or marriage. Respectively, kinship relations can be established 
mainly by adoption and in a few cases through MAR. The acknowledgement of 
kinship relations, apart from gender difference, falls within the framework of the “big 
reconfiguration” of family law, initially with the acknowledgement of kinship outside 
marriage and then kinship beyond genetic filiation54. This apt change proves a relation 
of progressive interaction between law and social reality. Thus the family law 
counteracts the legalization blow it suffered as a par excellence state law, since it 
constitutes the hard core of the field where the national legislator continues to have 
maximum discretionary power. The access of homosexuals to MAR (individually or 
in couples) constitutes yet another step in the construction of a pluralistic model of 
partnership relations co-articulation with the relations of kinship in the post-modern 
era. 
ΙΙ.3. The enlargement of the MAR scope in order to transcend the biological 
failure to reproduce due to sameness of gender  
 
The intersection of the social dynamics of MAR with the dynamics of same- 
gender family completes the structural change of the family model in the last quarter 
of the 20th century. The re-conceptualization of partnership is competed with that of 
kinship. Thanks to MAR, which uses anonymous reproductive material and the 
                                                          
52 Κaravokyris G., Family life and personal autonomy , in: Civil partnership agreement for same-gender 
couples. The adaptation of the Greek legislation, Athens, Marakoglou Foundation for human rights , 
Α.P.Publications, 2015, pp. 88-97, pp. 91-92. 
53 The length and breadth of the change recorded in the Rainbow Europe Index, in: http://www.ilga-
europe.org/home/publications/ reports_and_other_ materials/ rainbow_europe 
54 Rethymniotaki H., Family and law in Greece of the 21st century: trends of individualization and 
conventionalization, Minutes of the 3rd Ordinary Congress of the Hellenic Sociology Society, Elliniki 
Kinonia publications 1975-2010, re-classifications, challenges, Athens, 3-5 November 2011. 
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capacity of a woman to carry a child, the sexual contact between two people of a 
different gender has now stopped being a necessary requirement for procreation. So, 
biologically speaking, the obstacle of the inability of two people of the same gender to 
procreate through a sexual relationship is lifted. But is it also lifted from a social and 
cultural perspective, so as to be finally lifted both legally and politically? In order to 
connect the social and the legal concept of kinship the legislator, who has the 
constitutional jurisdiction to do so, needs to evaluate the extent and the depth of social 
change55. Two questions are broached De lege ferenda56. First whether the legislator 
will broadly enact joint parenthood, the one trilateral relationship within the 
framework of which two partners or spouses of the same gender undertake the 
responsibility of raising a child and share the right and the obligation of the child's 
legal guardianship57. Secondly, if the biological failure to reproduce due to sameness 
of gender can be regarded as insurmountable difficulty, different in nature though it 
may be, but also justifying a similar legal treatment- thereby allowing the legislator to 
make an explicit provision and expand the scope of MAR on that basis.  
In what concerns the former, family law creates, establishes and shapes 
kinship relations on the basis of biological fact or marriage/ partnership agreement, 
legal transaction and court rulings. Kinship is a legal concept and it does not always 
coincide with biological descent58. From an anthropological point of view kinship is 
not a hyperhistorical constant, dictated by nature, but a culturally constructed grid of 
relations59 which is legitimised through the rules of law, with rules of mandatory law 
even today, since private autonomy, enhanced though it may be, does not fall within 
the framework of kinship relations60. However, the argument of a “single-gender or 
gender-free, or devoid of gender connotations” kinship is that it will deal a crucial 
                                                          
55 Papadopoulou- Klamari D., Kinship. Establishment – Registration- Protection, Athens, Ant. Ν. 
Sakkoulas publications, 2010, p. 50. 
56 Rethymniotaki H.. (c), Same-gender couples and medically Assisted Reproduction: sexual freedom, 
family life and parental relations, in: Assisted Reproduction & alternative family models,: Ef. 
Κounougeri- Manoledaki./ G. Georgopoulos/Αn. Kalaitzi/ Β. Kantsa Venetia/ Κ. Κipouridou/ Ν. 
Κoumoutzis/ Μ. Μilapidou/ H. Rethymniotaki/ Chr. Sachinidou/ Αnt. Tsalidis/ Αsp. Chalkidou, 
Publications of Medical Law and Bioethics - vol. 18,Athens- Thessaloniki, Sakkoulas Publ., 2014, pp. 
147-180. 
57 Fassin E., Homosexual couples and same-gender families, in:M. Maruani (ed), Women, Gender, 
Society, Athens, Metechmio, 2006, p. 241-251. 
58 Papadopoulou- Klamari op.cit. p. 54. 
59 Κantsa Β., An indissoluble relation. The co-existence of gender and kinship in anthropological theory 
and practice, Synchrona Themata journal, 2006, issue 94, p. 72-78. 
60 Κotzabasi Ath., Gender equality and private autonomy in family relations- religious wedding 
ceremonies and multiculturality, Athens- Thessaloniki, Sakkoulas Ltd., 2011. 
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blow to the psycodevelopmental growth of the children involved.61. According to the 
western narrative on triangular kinship, this requires the implication of the Father- say 
in the mother-child relationship; the argument against is that western societies have a 
particularly stronger tendency to re-conceptualize already established relations of 
kinship and to invent new ones62. In a very short period of time children born outside 
marriage were acknowledged63, marriage was de-moralized64, adoption was 
reinforced and children born through MAR techniques were socially included. 
Already child-psychiatric 65 and ethnographic66 research concluded that there exist 
other factors that trouble children and that same-gender families do not differ 
structurally from heterosexual ones. It was obviously on the basis of these arguments 
that national legislators that recognized marriage of homosexual couples also 
provided for their ability to proceed to joint adoption (by the terms that apply to 
heterosexual couples as well). Since the purpose of marriage and long term 
partnership is the establishment of a family life, it goes without saying that this life 
comprises having children in every natural or legally permitted way. Since the 
legisaltor has acknowledged the right of marriage for homosexual couples, the non-
acknowledgement of their right to become parents would encroach on the very 
nucleus of their right to a family life67. Such refusal would be an blatant 
discrimination against them on the basis of legally shaky arguments and not fully 
evidence -based psychiatric, paediatric, anthropological or sociological views68.  
So what is the difference between adoption and MAR? In adoption the child exists 
already, and therefore it is in the child's best interest to live with a family, however 
apart from that legal argumentation is identical for both practices. Adoption and MAR 
                                                          
61 Τsakistraki, Ch., On symbolic effect of law and its limits: on the occasion of the French discourse 
about marriage for all, Synchrona Themata journal, July- September 2014, issue 126, p. 51-65. 
62 Godelier Μ., L’humanité n’a cessé d’inventer des nouvelles formes de marriage et de descendance, 
Le Monde, 17/11/2012 και Héritier Fr., Marriage pour tous. Audition d’anthropologues, d’ethnologues 
et de philosophes à l’Assemblée Nationale, 13.12.2012. 
63 Théry I., The dynamics of gender equality and the reconfigurations of kinship, in: M. Maruani (ed), 
Women, Gender, Society, Athens, Metechmio publications, 2006, pp. 209-219. 
64 Κamtsidou Ιf., Trends of marriage de-moralization in modern welfare states: the “Civil Solidarity 
Pact- PACS ”in France, Hellenic review on Human Rights, 2003, vol. 20, pp. 1151-1170. 
65 Pediatrics.publications.org/content/early/2013/peds.2013/03/18-0376 
66 Weston K., Families we choose: Lesbians, Gays, Kinship, New York, Columbia University, 1991 & 
1997 and Kantsa Β., Family relations, same-gender relations: expansions and reconceptualizations of 
family, in: Ν. Hadjitryfon/ Th. Papazisis (ed.), Gender and its behaviour. Families of Same-gender 
couples, Thessaloniki, Epikentro eds, 2007, p. 143-159. 
67 Papadopoulou op.cit and Papazisi Th., The family of persons of the same gender:Degeneration or 
equal treatment?, Chronicles of Private Law Ζ/2007, pp. 761-767. 
68 Loi no 2013-404 du 17 mai 2013 ouvrant le marriage aux couples de personnes de meme sexe και 
Reçu au greffe du Conseil constituionnel le 2 mai 2013, Le Gouvernement, p. 6-9.  
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constitute two forms of socio-emotional kinship. If the legislator accepts the fact that 
there can be kinship in same gender relationships in the first case, then for the same 
reason the legislator has to acknowledge the same in the second case. In fact, in 
practice having children through MAR is easier than adoption due to the limited 
number of children available but also because of social prejudice against homosexual 
couples. Furthermore, depending on their gender, by resorting to MAR homosexual 
couples can combine (at least for one of the two parents or even for both) biological 
ans socio-emotional kinship69. Nevertheless, the sameness of parent gender can lead 
respectively to two fathers (if the child conceived through MAR is born inside a 
marriage is the presumption of fatherhood applicable in favour of the other spouse?) 
and perhaps two mothers (depending on what is stipulated for surrogacy). In addition, 
it leads to the inability to establish kinship with the opposite-sex parent since the 
donor (male or female) of the reproductive material remains anonymous and devoid 
of any legal bond with the child. Unless, in order to avoid kinship-free procreation 
one acknowledges that between the donor and the child there can be a sort of 
'denuded' relation of kinship established, based on the presumption of biology70. For 
all these reasons an explicit legislative provision is required in order to protect the 
kinship relations of children. 
However, the second crucial question concerning the investigation of the 
reason for MAR applications or the extrapolation of inability to procreate for medical 
reasons to the failure to procreate due to sameness of gender remains unanswered. 
Here the wider issue of the power of the legislator to decide on the eligibility of 
candidates and the terms of using reproductive technology in order to become parents 
(individually or in couples) becomes relevant71. On top of that, another issue which 
                                                          
69 A couple of men can enter into contract with a surrogate mother (where this is permitted by 
legislation) and use a donor egg fertilized with the sperm of one of the two men. Respectively, a couple 
of women can use the sperm of an anonymous donor, which will fertilize the egg of one of the women 
and the fertilised egg will then be transferred to the other woman who will undergo the gestation. 
70 Concerning the revival of the biological criterion for the donor-progenitor who does not wish to 
become a parent, in the cases where the social-emotional criterion  is absent vide. Lekkas G.,M A.R.. 
and kinship under Greek law. Establishment of the socio-emotional kinship or procreation with no 
kinship, in: Th.Κ. Papachristou/ Ε. Κounougeri-Μanoledaki/ Α. Kotzabasi/ Ν. Κoumoutzis/G. Lekkas/ 
D. Papadopoulou-Κlamari/ P. Rabdas/ G. Sergidis/ Th. Τrokanas/ Κ. Foundedaki, Family law in the 21st 
century; from conjectural to structural change, Sakkoulas publications, Athens-Thessaloniki, 2011, p. 
41-51. 
71 Ibid p. 34 et seq. and Κounougeri- Manoledaki Ε., The law as an instrument of social control of 
assisted reproduction, Indiktos publ 14/2001, pp.145-154. 
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remains pending is the commercialisation of the female body and its particularly 
lucrative and ever-extended uses in the rapidly growing market of MAR services.72  
In one sense, the possibility to allow the use of  MAR by same-gender couples 
with no infertility problems would overly expand the scope of insurmountable 
difficulties, because in the particular case the failure to procreate is not attributable to 
an illness or physical impairment but emanates from the biologically imposed, 
gender-based character of sexuality that actually leads to procreation73. However, one 
could argue that equality demands that when the right of access to reproductive 
technology is acknowledged to couples whose sexual relations can lead to 
reproduction, the same right should be acknowledged for those couples whose 
relations do not74. It must also be highlighted that according to the case law of the 
ECHR, denial of the possibility of access to in vitro fertilization falls under the scope 
of article 8 on the protection of family life, because it expresses the decision of the 
members of a couple to become parents75. The argument against is that in the first 
case the matter is indeed related to the medically diagnosed inability to reproduce 
while in the second it is all about choice. But what does the choice of a partner of the 
same gender express one would wonder; a rational choice whose consequences must 
be suffered as a penalty by homosexual couples or an insurmountable psychological 
reality which practically deprives them of the ability to reproduce? 
The answer to the question is not easy; not so much because of the legal 
description of the inability of homosexual couples to procreate in general, but because 
of the fact that generally speaking MAR is under a state of constant strain regarding 
what is permitted, to whom, by whom and under what circumstances. Its legislation 
constitutes an open procedure where there is no room for definitive answers but a 
constant need for re-evaluation, not only of its technological potential but also of 
innovative social practices. That is why invariably all legislations designated MAR as 
a therapeutic practice. Nevertheless, due to the great differences among legal 
regulations (and not only practical applications) the definition scope of inability to 
                                                          
72 Κotzabasi Α., Right to motherhood and in vitro fertilization: a political issue, Paratiritis-Epikentro 
publications, Thessaloniki, 2003. 
73 Théry Ι. (dir.), Mariage des personnes de même sexe et filiation: le projet de loi au prisme des 
sciences sociales, Paris, Éditions de l’EHESS, coll. «Cas de figure», 2013. 
74 Neirinck C., Accorder le marriage aux personnes de meme sexe, oui. Reconnaître un droit à l’enfant, 
non. Pourquoi? Droit de la Famille, Les revues Jurisclasseurs, Janvier 2013, no 1, p. 11-12. 
75 The Case of Dickson v. United Kingdom (4.12.07) which concerned granting permission to a life-
sentenced male prisoner to have access to IVF services for the fertilization of his wife. 
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procreate and the legal forms of treatment vary to a considerable extent. In the end the 
difference lies in the margin of flexibility of every legal order, the extent to which it 
allows innovative technological advances and social practices, which enable their 
application, to transform the already existent legal system of kinship and its 
categories. Nevertheless fatherhood can in fact be legally presumed, in the only case 
in which it does not correspond with the biological truth between a shadow of a doubt 
Wherever surrogacy is not permitted the legal status of motherhood is redefined76. 
Therefore any change that the regulation of the use of MAR by same-gender couples 
will bring about to the current legal categories of kinship will be attributed more to 
the social dynamics of reproductive technology development and less to the sameness 
of gender of the couples that will have access to it.. 
 
ΙΙ.4. MAR and same-gender families: the divided social attitudes and the 
contradictions within the Greek family law  
 
In the Greek society according to the survey carried out by the European 
Social Research council (2010-2012) the rate of homosexuality acceptance amounts to 
51%77. Even though it has increased spectacularly the above percentage remains 
among the lowest in Europe. Opinions are divided, even though there are considerable 
differences exhibited in accordance with the age and political convictions of the 
respondents78. Because of economic, political and cultural changes, especially after 
the 90's, there has been a redefinition of gender and sexual identities as well as family 
practices, however no survey has made clear to what extent. The factors that explain 
intolerance towards different sexual orientations are numerous. Because of the Greek 
political history the assimilation of democracy and individual rights has been rather 
                                                          
76 Rethymniotaki (2008) op.cit.  
77 ESS1_5_select_findings. Pdf, This is a survey which is repeated every two years and looks into the 
social trends and attitudes in the countries of EU in order to collect information, which will then be 
used for the production of policies. In answer to the question of whether “ gay men and lesbian women 
should be free to lead their lives as they see fit” the survey for the period of 2002-2004 recorded that 
47% of respondents answered yes,  26%  disagreed, while 20% were somewhere in between (neither 
agreeing, nor disagreeing)! During the last decade the percentage has remained stagnant in its lowest 
levels. It approaches the rate of eastern european countries and presents a difference compared to 
Mediterranean countries (Spain 81% - Portugal 63%). 
78 Rethymniotaki H. (c), Cohabitation of same-gender couples. A challenge for current mentalities in 
Greek society, Family Law Society banquet, Nomiki Bibliothiki publications, Athens 2/10/2014. 
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slow and the gay movement has developed after the year 200079. As it so happens in 
all countries of the European south the institution of family has been deconstructed to 
a lesser extent, due to its economic role and its welfare function. The Mediterranean 
cultural perception of genders and sexual behaviour is “physiocratic”, it is based on 
the dichotomy of male/active and female/ passive sexual nature. Homosexual 
practices between men “could fit within” the confines of masculinity without 
subverting it and those between women existed in silence80. As soon as homosexuals 
make an opening and assert another male or female identity for themselves, they 
immediately shake the naturality of both masculinity and femininity of the rest of the 
people, which explains the reason why they are not readily tolerated. 
In public discourse, while MAR and its regulation have gained social 
acceptance, homosexual partnership and its regulation still divide public opinion. The 
former is related to the natural duty of Greek women to become mothers81, the latter 
to the questioning of their male nature. In fact the Greek legislator of family law has 
been bold in the regulation of MAR and did not hesitate to acknowledge even the 
most controversial practices that lead to the transcendance of biological boundaries, 
such as the inability to carry a child or the death of one of the partners in a couple. 
However, provocatively ignoring homosexual partnership the legislator did not 
include it in the alternative form of co-habitation under law3719/2008 and thereby 
encroached on the right to equality 82, which led to the sentence by the ECJ on the 
grounds of discriminatory treatment due to non-mainstream sexual orientation83. Now 
the legislator is called upon to finally clarify the choices made in what concerns the 
civil partnership agreement and whether this will in fact be different from marriage, 
                                                          
79 Giannakopoulos Κ., cultural conceptualizations of loneliness: kinship, community and LGBT 
policies, in: Apostolelli A/ Chalkia Α., Body, Gender, Sexuality , policies of the LGBT movement in 
Greece, Athens, Plithron publ., 2012 pp. 173-196. 
80 Κantsa Β., Potential mistresses, potential friends, Athens, Polychromos Planitis publ,  2010, p. 57 
and Giannakopoulos Κ., male identity, body and gender relations. An approach to gender and sexuality, 
in: Dimitriou, s. (eds.), Anthropology of the sexes, Athens, Savvalas publ, 2001, pp. 161-187, esp. p. 
171. 
81 Τoundasaki Ir., “Biology”, “Genetics” and “Socio-emotional” mother: conceptualizations of 
motherhood and familiness in parliamentary discourse on MAR, in: Β. Κantsa, Motherhood in the 
limelight. Modern research into Greek ethnography, Athens,, Alexandria publications, 2013, pp. 119-
146. 
82 Stabelou Chr., Civil Partnership Agreement and Equality, Chronicles of Private Law, Θ/2009, p. 189-
192. 
83 Μallios Β. (a), Legitimization of same-gender couples cohabitation; Greek reality and European 
dimension, 03.06.2010 www.constitutionalism.gr/html/ent/583/ent. 1583.asp and Nikolakopoulos 
P., The exclusion  of same-gender couples from the cohabitation agreement  under law 3719/2008 and 
the 7.11.2013 ECJ ruling in the case of “Vallianatos and others versus Greece” , Nomiko Vima Hellenic 
Law Review , 2014/ 7, vol. 62, 2014, p.1785-1789. 
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and if yes to what an extent, since it will now apply to both heterosexual and 
homosexual couples. However the matter keeps being postponed. Now, concerning 
same-gender couple marriage, the wedding ceremonies of gay activists on the island 
of Tilos, which were finally declared null and void, have provided an opportunity for 
a wider discussion of the issue by Greek legal theorists84. However, drawing on the 
experience of other countries, the above is a step that typically follows the legislation 
and enactment of the cohabitation agreement. In fact, according to the European 
Social Research council cited above, the legislation has significantly increased social 
acceptance of homosexual couples in all the countries where it was adopted, thus 
proving the pedagogical role of law. 
According to the above facts, the discussion for the establishment of kinship 
relations through adoption and, much more, through MAR seems at a first glance to 
be a table-top exercise. We should point out, however, that social attitudes may be 
divided on same-gender families but according to the afore-mentioned survey it is not 
true that same-gender families clash with prevalent opinions. It is only certain, 
though, that the lack of an institutional framework leads to problems in terms of 
international private law85. De lege lata only the legitimization of marriage will 
enable access to joint adoption or the adoption of the natural child of a spouse, since 
in accordance with the Greek law this process is provided for only for spouses86. In 
what concerns the formation of relations through MAR an explicit provision is needed 
in view of protecting the kinship relations involving children and the expansion of the 
scope of reproductive technology, so that the same-gender family can transcend the 
biological barrier related to the lack of gender difference87. Nevertheless, there exists 
                                                          
84 Papazisi Th., Marriage of persons of the same gender: valid, non-valid or null and void? Chronicles 
of Private Law Θ/2009, pp. 851-856, Vlachopoulos Sp., the problematics of legal associations of 
persons of the same gender, in: Kanellopoulou- Boti Μ./ Κoutnatzi- Panagopoulou F., Bioethical 
Concerns, Athens, Papazisis publ, 2014, pp. 643-651, Papadopoulou op.cit. And Karavokyris idem. 
85 The unpublished ruling of the Athens CoFI of  2129/2011 was against that, not acknowledging the 
precedent of a Belgian court ruling under which two same-gender spouses adopted an under age boy, 
on the grounds that: “the establishment of a same-gender family model constitutes a real condition 
which goes against the prevalent principles and mentalities that govern life and living in Greek society 
…which has neither a legal framework to manage it nor is it proggressive enough to tolerate it. Let it be 
noted that its difference of nature can prove to the detriment of the child involved, who will be 
subjected to derogatory remarks from his wider social surroundings”. 
86 Foundedaki Κ., Unions of people of the same gender: their out-of -time treatment by the Greek legal 
order, a legislative proposal and its implications, in: Civil partnership agreement of same-gender 
couples. The adaptation of Greek legislation, Athens, Maragopoulos Foundation for human rights 
(MFHR), Α.P. Publications, 2015, p. 59-85. 
87 Foundedaki op.cit.and Rethymniotaki op. cit (2014b)  
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a certain fluidity emanating from the permissive nature of the Greek legal framework 
for the regulation of MAR The legislator has already acknowledged the right of 
spouses/partners and single women to have access to MAR. Moreover, the legislator 
has also allowed women to carry children on behalf of other women, on certain 
conditions. So the question that arises is what will happen if the civil partnership 
agreement is acknowledged for homosexual couples as well. According to one view88 
legislators wanted to open access only for heterosexual couples. But if this be the 
case, won't the issue of discriminatory treatment arise again?  
So, de lege ferenda, after the inclusion of relations of same-gender partnership 
in the Greek legal order the legislator needs to examine the above issues anew, 
consistently adopting some crucial choices which will not lead to contradictions. The 
other choice would be to either exclude both heterosexual and homosexual partners 
(in which case MAR will grow closer to adoption) or to allow both to have access. 
The same applies to the access of single men to MAR, which may have been settled in 
the case law for the time being, however there exists a theoretical dimension to it, too, 
not without reason. The legislator could have limited access only to couples, within 
the framework of a policy that promotes the concept that every child needs to have 
two parents, irrespective of the nature of the relation between them or its legislative 
validity. However, since the use of the technique was allowed for single women, who 
need male reproductive material to actually achieve results the question that readily 
arises is why should men , who need a woman for gestation, be excluded89. The latter 
may be different biologically speaking, however the outcome concerning the kinship 
ties of children is the same since on both occasions the children born will lack a legal 
parent of either gender, given the anonymity of donation90. Moreover, regarding 
surrogacy, of course it should be evaluated against the strong trend of 
commercialisation of the female body but since we do not consider it to be a practice 
against public order, one needs very strong arguments to exclude its use based on 
criteria of gender and sexual orientation. For all intents and purposes, procrastination 
and partial solutions (e.g the de facto de-activation of the MAR Authority, the non-
                                                          
88 Foundedaki op. cit. 
89 Κoumoutzis Ν., article 1457 CC in Αp. Georgiadis/ Μ. Stathopoulou, Civil Code, interpretation 
article for article, Family Law (articles 1346-1504), vol. 7, 20072, Κounougeri- Manoledaki, Ε., 
Commentary on  the ruling of the one-member CoFI of Athens,  ruling no 2827/2008, Society for the 
Study of Medical Law and Bioethics, Jan.Feb. March 2010, vol. 9 and Papachristou Th. K. Remarks on 
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compliance with the ECHR ruling) end up dealing a decisive blow to the prestige of 
law in the conscience of citizens.  
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